by Sohail Nazir – LFIT expert on immigration issues

He has always considered himself G.W. Bush’s junior sheriff, always willing to take care of nearby countries and conflicts of the wide southern Pacific Ocean. Well-behaved, married, conservative with Christian values. Who else could this be other than John Howard, the former Australian prime minister?

You might laugh on the sofa and wonder what the point is of remarking on a former head of government and even one who sided with Bush and his illegal war on Iraq? Well, I have nothing to offer against such a response. In fact, you are right.

Yet, when glancing over a pile of crumpled Australian morning papers dating some years back, I realised a spectre was haunting Europe: the spectre of John Howard. Howard’s policies on migration leant remarkably towards human rights violation. Unprecedented for a Rechtsstaat, in which the state ought to protect human dignity, he detained foreigners on far-off isolated Pacific Islands.

This spectre inexorably swept to Europe and detention camps subsequently became the buzzword. A debate ensued throughout this continent. Proud of the achievements of the Magna Charta and the Geneva Refugee Convention, Western Europe suddenly assembled a political will, namely, to quasi arrest refugees.

With about 40 million foreign refugees (Schmelz, A. 2006), roughly 8 million illegal immigrants in the domains of the European Union (Financial Times. 2008), public climate towards asylum seekers is one of growing hostility.  This hostility is fuelled by right-wing populists. In the wake of Tunisians arriving on the Italian island of Lampedusa, Italian Interior Minister, Maroni, hyperbolically spoke of a “biblical exodus” (Donadio, R. and Daley, S. 2011). He even seriously suggested sending troops to Tunisia to halt illegal immigration. It was a diplomatic faux-pas, deemed to fail from its very outset. After all, which sovereign nation-state voluntarily invites foreign troops onto their soil?

Learning lessons from Uncle Howard, Maroni’s hyperbolism is revealing, for his government co-operated with Tunisia’s ousted dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. An accord was signed. Accordingly, Ben Ali’s regime received financial incentives to step up obstacles to would-be illegal immigrants. Seemingly, that accord has become invalid since Ben Ali had to relinquish the reins of power as result of the recent revolution in Tunisia.

It is not bad news that such bilateral agreements have become null and void because some reports do suggest mistreatments done to would-be migrants. For example, a report concealed that “electric shock batons were used to force migrants off the boats in Libya” (Donadio, R. and Daley, S. 2011), another state with a poor record on human rights. Similar allegations have been leveled against other regimes, which co-operated with the EU before some of them, quite recently, started crumbling.

That human beings cannot be regarded as illegal is an understandable reminder often echoed from non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch. They call into question some EU national governments’ de facto treatment of refugees as criminals. Their treatment is not fair; it is based on prejudice and is stigmatized.

Ignoring criticism, European leaders (including some social democrats) unscrupulously started co-operating with dictatorial regimes, such as Morocco, Tunisia and also Ghaddafi’s Libya. For the latter, Berlusconi developed a bizarre fondness (before the landmark uprisings), culminating in kissing the Colonel’s hand. Indeed, one can easily see a double standard deployed by western states in dealing with human rights. The very recent political insurgency in Libya resulted in western-led airstrikes against the brutal dictatorship in the name of human rights, whereas, just a few months ago, human rights violation was not a supreme concern and consequently a rallying cause of action.

At that time, EU national leaders were learning lessons from Australian Howard. In a similar fashion to Australia, they have been interested in setting up de facto prisons for refugees, thus treating migrants as convicted criminals. This went hand in hand with active help from Colonel Gaddafi and other dictators on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. What is more, this disparaging treatment is confirmed by the fact that children were not spared.

Such off-shore camps were first discussed at an EU summit of interior ministers in Scheveningen in 2004.  Based on this, three critical points have to be discussed: firstly, migrants who try to seek refuge from war or other disasters are cut off from the basic principle that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from prosecution” (Art. 14, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Secondly, their destiny is often subject to randomness by third countries, which have poor records on human rights, for example, Morocco and Libya. Thirdly, most asylum cases would go unnoticed by the public as they are outside the EU borders. NGOs did also report about human rights violation in similar camps established by Australia.

Who is legal and who is illegal? The answer does not have any moral basis because there is a certain level of arbitrariness in this division between illegal and legal refugees. This peculiar arbitrariness, a politically motivated selection of migrants, is underscored by EU’s asylum and migration policies. And this is demonstrated by the European Union’s introduction of a so-called Blue card scheme. According to this, migrants rather ought to fit neatly into the economic frame, solely contributing to the well-being of the EU labour market. In order to remain competitive, it is necessary to resort to solutions tackling the mismatch of unqualified domestic workers to the demand of increasingly high skills in the booming service sector.

This selection leads us to the public sector economists as they have since portrayed migration in two faces. Researching on market failures and imperfect competition in communities, they illustrate the endless game of costs and benefits. Whether skilled laborers or not, new individuals in a new community may increase the tax base, making secretaries of the treasury deliriously happy. But to flip the coin the other way, they may also strain the increasing demand on public services, infrastructure and housing etc. (Stiglitz, J.E. 2000. p. 737).

This rather aloof factor calculation crunched by some economists, dividing migration into costs and benefits, does bear consequences: a European Fortress has been constructed. The island of the rich man is protected from the poor masses of the South. This costs and benefits calculation has since gained a new dynamic. Just as competition is the crucial component of microeconomics, so is selection for the EU migration and asylum policy.

Whilst the EU has gradually widened, edged and stepped up alertness around her Fortress keeping away uninvited migrants, it has left a protected doorway open for qualified migrants. They are welcome to enter the rich man’s gate. No doubt, we need them. After all, they correct the mismatch in the EU domestic market. Not only are we less willing to settle down and have children, we are also in the midst of an educational crisis. Our domestic labour force is not sufficiently trained to meet the increasing standards of job openings that require high-level qualifications in the growing service sector and, moreover, not prepared to take low-paid jobs e.g. in farming. This mismatch leads to high levels of unemployment in Western Europe. The jobs are there. The people qualified for them are not.

As a consequence, we easily indulge in a culture of brain gain and brain loss. With lucrative job offers we try to gain the brainiest people from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Qualified third country nationals are a treasure for their own country of origin. They could contribute enormously to their developing countries’ economies. But those people are invited over to Europe, lured by the European blue card.

A bizarre game is played which former EU Justice Commissioner Frattini sugarcoated as a brain circulation. To him the Blue card would also be beneficial to the country of origin.  Life-long contacts would be made as well as foreign experience. True, but the fact remains, the EU is engaged in a brain gain-brain loss policy.

In conclusion, the recent EU’s asylum and migration policies are based on arbitrary selection criteria, co-operation with doubtful regimes and militarisation. We have witnessed that European countries have become states of selective immigration. Once more, growth-driven, neo-liberally framed, EU economic policies deride humanitarianism and human welfare. European states pursue competitive advantage. On the one hand they open their domestic economies to international migration, while on the other hand internal political forces drive them to seal off the borders. Leading to this antagonistic dynamic, EU national governments commence to manage migration. Such regulation solely follows their economic interests. They encourage certain streams, whilst stemming others. The EU migration policy clearly differentiates between highly educated professionals and low skilled migrants in order to compete with the US and the emerging economies. The low skilled migrants are perceived as a burden (Erel, U. 2009, p. 3). Stemming these is a doubtful practice. Detention camps outside the EU put these undesired migrants in de-facto confinements. Unprotected migrants are left at the mercy of dictators. John Howard’s migration policies are therefore wrong. They are against the fundamental values upon which the European Union is based. Being human cannot be illegal. Everyone seeking refuge has the right to make her or his case be heard. That is why treating a refugee or an asylum seeker as a criminal is unjust. This EU policy approach of selection criteria and Uncle Howard’s detention camps are cracked at several places; making a hard felt hat much too worse to wear.

Nota Bene

EU migration policy is that complex and complicated that short policy essays cannot encapsulate everything. The next policy essay on migration will again be a continuation. I will again critically look at the regulation of migration this time by analysing EU’s regional protection programmes. This will be accompanied by an interview I have conducted in Valencia of a migrant who travelled across Europe in search of a better future. It is designed to open our eyes by shedding light on the view migrants have on Europe. A brief article on David Cameron’s migration speech will offer the other side of the coin.

Bibliography

Associated Press. 9-10/04/2011. “Italy and France agree on handling Tunisian migrants”. In International Herald Tribune. Global Edition of New York Times, p. 3.

Donadio, R. and Daley, S. 9/3/2011. “Revolts Raise Fear of Migration in Europe”. In International Herald Tribune. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/europe/10europe.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=migration&st=cse accessed on 20/03/2011.)

Erel, U. 2009. “Qualifikation von Migrantinnen – eine Frage der Bürgerrechte?“ In Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 26th Oktober. Vol. 44., p. 3-6

German Basic Law. 1999. http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm accessed on 15/02/2011.

Harding, J. 2000. The Uninvited. Refugees at the Rich Man’s Gate. London: Profile Books and the London Review Books.

Hayter, T. 2004. Open Borders. The case against immigration controls. London: Pluto Press.

Schmelz, A. 2006. Network Migration in Europe. http://www.migrationeducation.org/17.0.html accessed on 24/03/2011.

Stiglitz, J.E. 2000. Economics of the Public Sector. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company.

The United Nations. UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a14 accessed on 14/02/2011.

By Chiara Benassi

PhD Candidate at LSE, Department of Management

c.benassi@lse.ac.uk

Since December 23, 2010, the FIAT plant at Mirafiori (Turin) is no longer covered by the national collective agreement. Instead, a special agreement was signed by two of the three metalworker trade unions, FIM-CISL and UILM, and then ratified by a referendum among the workers themselves. The third, biggest and most representative union, FIOM-CGIL, refused to sign and a clause of the agreement now excludes it from the representation in the plant[i].

Both the content of the agreement and the modalities for negotiation are highly disputable: under the threat of closing the plant, employees accepted toughened working conditions such as the introduction of 10-hour and night shifts, the reduction of break time and sick leaves and the restriction of strike rights.

This article will discuss the meaning and the implications of FIAT CEO Sergio Marchionne’s landmark industrial relations strategy marking the end of national collective bargaining. By doing so, it will draw a parallel between recent developments in industrial relations in Italy and Germany, so as to show the consequences of collective bargaining erosion on the basis of the evidence arising from the German case.

Germany and Italy: two systems of industrial relations at a crossroad?

Over the last fifteen years, Germany has experienced a fast decline of sectoral collective bargaining in favor of decentralization. Therefore, the German experience provides a good case to assess the impact of this new phenomenon.

Collective bargaining coverage among employees shrunk from 76% (Western Germany) and 63% (Eastern Germany) in 1998[ii] to 56% and 38% in 2009[iii]. Since the mid-1990s, plant-level agreements have proliferated as a result of the enactment of the so-called “opening clause”, authorizing the opt-outs of national agreement. Moreover, additional “pacts for employment and competitiveness” have been signed at the plants level, which also depart from the standards bargained at national level and reduce total compensation for workers.[iv]

In Italy, collective bargaining coverage is estimated around 80%. Since the 1990s, however, a progressive decentralization can be observed. In 1993 a tripartite agreement between the government, the employers’ organization Confindustria, and the three confederal unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL) formalized the company-level bargaining, introducing a new representative body for unions and workers and specifying the issues to be negotiated – such as pay enhancements related to company productivity and performance[v]. The agreement signed in 2009 between the government and the two national trade unions, CISL and UIL, allows the application of opening clauses in cases where the company is under restructuring or if employment creation and economic growth can thereby be promoted[vi].

In Germany (and in Italy as well) the membership in the employers’ organization is voluntary, which implies that the coverage of the collective agreements bargained between unions and employers’ organizations at sectoral level is also optional. Therefore, companies have progressively dropped it, exploiting the exit option from the national collective bargaining system[vii]. The opt-outs have been so frequent that since 2006 companies have been given the option to join the employers’ organization without being covered by the national collective agreement (Ohne Tarifbindung – Mitgliedschaft). This phenomenon recalls the recent events between FIAT and Confindustria (the Italian employers’ organization): following Sergio Marchionne’s announcement that FIAT was to leave Confindustria, President of Confindustria Emma Marcegaglia made public the call for a new role of the organization, which would only provide services and political representation to the members, thus leaving to companies the bargaining of wages and working conditions[viii].

The impact of bargaining decentralization on income in Germany

Germany has often been referred to as a positive model in the public debates and articles around the Mirafiori issue, and, quite interestingly, from both those who were pro and against the agreement. This is not surprising: Germany is at the moment the leading economy in Europe with a GDP growth of 2.2% in August 2010[ix]. The export-oriented metal sector is the driving force of German economy. Salaries are much higher for German metal workers than for their Italian colleagues, the former earning a gross monthly salary of around 1,900€ (second wage level)[x], whereas the latter earn 650€ less[xi]. Such success is also attributed to the flexibility of the German economic model, which the abovementioned decentralization of the last decade has contributed to.

However, the GDP growth rate alone does not tell the whole story about Germany. In the metal sector, salaries are high but that should not be attributed to the sole process of decentralization of bargaining and to the proliferation of company level agreements. Salaries are mainly set through national collective agreements, which are negotiated between the employers’ association and the powerful union IG-Metall and cover 65% of the sector (in 2007)[xii].  A few companies, such as the often-cited Volkswagen, pay over the sectoral collective agreement. Nonetheless, the company-level salaries do not result from a kind concession of the employer, but from the bargaining between the management and the works council, which has strong information and co-decisional rights (Mitbestimmung) set by law.

According to reports and academic analyses, decentralization of bargaining is generally associated with inequality and low pay[xiii] and Germany is no exception. Indeed, according to the OECD, “since 2000, income inequality and poverty have grown faster in Germany than in any other OECD country”[xiv], and the declining of sectoral collective bargaining is considered one of the main causes[xv]. The figures below illustrate the recent wage development in Germany and cast some shadows on the German “economic miracle”. Figure 1 shows that Germany is the only EU country where the real wage growth has been negative between 2000 and 2008. Figure 2 compares the size of the low-pay sector in different OECD countries in 2006, showing that Germany follows the US with the second largest low-wage sector (calculated as percentage of low-paid workers on the total workforce).

Source: http://www.boeckler.de/32015_92684.html

Source:  Schulten 2010[xvi]

Lessons for Italy

If bargaining decentralization had controversial effects in Germany, this trend raises even more questions with regards to Italy, where the power of workers and unions is limited. Workers’ representation at company level in Italy is much weaker than in Germany, as the representation bodies (Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie-RSU) have less information and bargaining rights than German works councils. In addition to this, Italian unions are more fragmented than German unions and this could lead to downward competition between concurring company-level agreements. Therefore, bargaining decentralization could have even more serious effects on income distribution in Italy than in Germany.

As a matter of fact, Sergio Marchionne’s opting out is not likely to remain an exception and other companies will probably exit the national collective agreements. This scenario raises concerns not only, and not particularly, for the metal sector but for the wider economy. The metal sector would probably maintain decent pay levels and working conditions even with a lower coverage of the national collective agreements, given the relatively high unionization and the developed social dialogue. However, the same logic cannot be assumed for other sectors, such as the service sector, where union density is low and social dialogue structures are not in place.

In January 2011, Fincantieri withdrew from the national collective agreement in Genoa and Gorizia. Trying the difficult business of fortune telling, it can be plausibly argued that Fincantieri is only the first victim of the “Marchionne effect”.

[i] Il Post (27.12.2010). “Che Cosa C’ E’ nell’Accordo di Mirafiori.” Retrieved 25.02.2011, from http://www.ilpost.it/2010/12/27/spiegazione-accordo-fiat-mirafiori/.

[ii] EIRO (2010). “Germany. Industrial Relations Profile.” Retrieved 02/03/2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/germany_4.htm.

[iii] Vogel, S. (2009). “Assessing Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining Coverage.” Retrieved 02/03/2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/05/articles/de1005029i.htm.

[iv] Addison, J. T., A. Bryson, et al. (2009). The Extent of Collective Bargaining and Workplace Representation: Transitions between States and their Determinants. A Comparative Analysis of Germany and Great Britain. Discussion Paper No. 4502. Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labour.

[v] EIRO (2009). “Italy. Accordo 23 Luglio 1993.”. Retrieved 26.02.2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/ITALY/AGREEMENTOF23JULY1993-IT.htm.

[vi] Pedersini, R. (2009). “Cgil Refuses to Sign Agreement on Collective Bargaining Reform.” Retrieved 23.02.2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/02/articles/it0902059i.htm.

[vii] Addison, J. T., A. Bryson, et al. (2009). The Extent of Collective Bargaining and Workplace Representation: Transitions between States and their Determinants. A Comparative Analysis of Germany and Great Britain. Discussion Paper No. 4502. Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labour.

[viii] Corriere della Sera (21.01.2011). “Intervista ad Emma Marcegaglia – “Cambio la Confindustria. E Dico Sì alla Partecipazione dei Lavoratori agli Utili” – Marcegaglia: Rappresentanza e Contratti, è Ora di Riformare la Confindustria.” Retrieved 20.02.2011, from http://rassegnastampa.mef.gov.it/mefeconomica/View.aspx?ID=2011012117686933-2.

Il Sole 24 Ore (22.01.2011). “Imprenditori D’Accordo con Marcegaglia: Pronti a Contratti Aziendali e a una Confindustria più Snella.” Retrieved 20.02.2011, from http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/economia/2011-01-21/imprenditori-accordo-marcegaglia-pronti-224449.shtml?uuid=AaV07m1C.

[ix] Financial Times (19.08.2011). “German Economic Growth Set to Hit 3%.” Retrieved 22.02.2011, from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d164d0da-aba5-11df-9f02-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1GacqYUQz.

[x] The second level has been chosen because the first level covers only the trainees in Germany.

[xi] The salary for German workers is an approximation of the salaries set by collective agreement in different Bundslaender in March, 2010 (Source: WSI-Tarifarchiv:http://www.boeckler.de/549_108038.html, download on 11.03.11).

The source for the salary of Italian metal workers is the Contratto Collettivo Nazionale del Lavoro, signed between Federmeccanica, FIOM, FIM and UILM in January, 2008.

[xii] Vogel, S. and B. Kraemer (2010). “Representativeness of the European Social Partner Organisations: Metal Sector – Germany.” Retrieved 20/01/2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0911017s/de0911019q.htm.

[xiii] Blau, F. D. and L. M. Kahn (1996). International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: Institutions versus Market Forces, National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.

Katz, H. C. and O. Darbishire (2000). Converging Divergences. Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems. Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press.

European Commission (2008). Industrial Relations in Europe 2008. Brussels, Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.

[xiv] OECD (2008). Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. Germany: Country Note.

[xv] Keune, M. (2009). Introduction. Wages and Wage Bargaining in Europe. B. Galgoczi: 7-27.

Bosch, G., K. Mayhew, et al. (2010). Industrial Relations, Legal Regulations and Wage Setting. Low Wage in the Wealthy Work. J. Gautié and J. Schmitt. New York, Russel Sage Publications: 91-146.

[xvi] Schulten, T. (2010). Deutschlands lohnpolitische Sonderrolle in Europa. Tarifpolitische Tagung. W.-u. S. I. (WSI). Duesseldorf, 21-22 Sept. 2010.

Remarks About 2009 PISA Assessment

The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is one of the tools offered to policy makers to evaluate and compare the performances of schooling systems. Within an internationally agreed framework, based on an empirical approach which analyzes data collected according to the endogenous growth model –(http://www.pisa.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_32252351_32236191_44417722_1_1_1_1,00.html), it monitors the improvements of educational systems of the countries participating to the tests, covering questions and problems in the field of maths, natural sciences and reading. (http://www.pisa.oecd.org/pages/0,2987,en_32252351_32235731_1_1_1_1_1,00.html) Students at age of 15 are examined in an interval of three years.

A brief overview

The results of the latest PISA assessment, with the successful performances of Korea and Singapore as well as entities like Hong Kong and Shanghai, confirmed the leading role of Asian countries in the economic and social development.

Among the western countries, however, a divided picture appeared. Whereas Canada, Finland and Sweden are among the high achievers, the scores of students from southern European countries particularly that of Italy and Portugal show deficiencies and contradictions of schooling systems, lacking long-term strategies.

Policies and “myths”

Few weeks ago, in the columns of the Wall Street Journal an article was wondering “Why Chinese Mothers are superior?” underlying the gap in performances between students with Chinese background living in the US and others with a different cultural heritage. In particular, the author remarked the central role played by discipline in the educational strategies of Chinese mothers  (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704111504576059713528698754.html?mod=WSJ_hp_us_mostpop_read#articleTabs%3Darticle), providing somehow a cultural-mythological explanation to a western reader, presumably worried about the results and perspectives of his son/daughter.

However, reading carefully all the analyses and surveys related to PISA and its results, it seems that when systems are more standardized and monitored, they are able to offer wider opportunities of success, whatever the student’s background or cultural heritage are. Performances indeed are higher not only in the wealthy part of Asia, but also in western countries where traditionally the state is organized to take care of citizens from “cradle to grave”, and where policy makers pay particular attention to the issue of equal opportunities. In the Asian case, though, the “winning” formula includes high salary for trainers and, at the same time, more responsibilities, such as a higher number of students per class. As a result, discipline becomes a key tool not only for educators at home, but also at school.

On the other hand, the low scores of Italian students can be put in relationship with the lack of competition among the schools, which are not funded on the basis of their merit and performances. In spite of the autonomy over what is taught and on how student are assessed, Italian schools are not obliged to make their achievement data publicly, avoiding to be accountable for results and to compete for enrolling students. As a consequence, in Italy the success of a single person is mainly influenced by his social background and by the geographical location of the school (city-countryside; uptown-downtown; north-south). The structural weakness of this system, unable to bridge the social gap, is more evident when analyzing the performances of immigrates, scoring generally 53 points below natives, and being only 5% of the total amount of students (while in Spain, Belgium and Sweden immigrates are respectively 9%, 15% and 12% of the total, scoring instead 40% below natives’ average). This case shows how policies focused only on funding, without a critical strategy about the allocation and management of the resources, do not provide successful results.

On the contrary, the 1999 reform of education in Poland can be seen as a good example of governance and political will. Following the demise of communism, this country’s educational institutions were unable to connect students to the job market, and what is more they failed to provide them an appropriate preparation for university, mainly addressing students to vocational tracking, once ended a first cycle of 8 years. The government therefore approved a reorganization that reduced from 8 to 6 years long the primary school, introduced a 3 years long lower secondary school and created various types of upper secondary schools. These changes were accompanied by a curricular reform aimed at providing schools with extensive autonomy and responsibility, within a system of examinations and tests at the end of primary and lower secondary cycles. As a result, in a decade Polish students have achieved higher educational attainments and Polish students participating in the PISA study shifted from the bottom to the upper scale.

Conclusion

As noted above, the more policy makers are committed to create an open and updated educational system, aimed at offering equal opportunities in terms of schools, teachers and programs, the more performances improve. This is particularly clear regarding Canada, Sweden, Finland, Singapore, Korea, etc.

On the other hand, the Italian case illustrates how, when policy makers are unable to control an inefficient bureaucratic structure, it becomes the feeding ground of a diverted conception of the welfare state, where nobody is responsible for the correct or incorrect allocation of funds and there is a double loss: economic and human. When trying to reform an educational system, policy makers should first of all consider transparency in governance as precondition of competitiveness and do not forget that school opens the way to the job market as well as to the citizenship. As PISA assessment suggests, a system where equal opportunities are not provided to the majority of students is potentially a system where civil participation and economic development are at risk.

In 2006, authorities in Spain detained about 28,000 refugees on the Canary Islands, while some 16,000 reached Italy’s Lampedusa Island.² In 2005 an autumn of discontent hit the suburban areas of Paris, les banlieues.³ The French authorities were hit by a series of violent attacks, mostly by the unemployed and youth mobs, mainly of North African descent. They set cars on fire, smashed windows and challenged public authorities, largely owing to the French government’s decade-long neglect of their wretched living conditions.  In 2002 the centre-left Schröder-Fischer government in Berlin introduced a Green card scheme in order to attract computer specialists for the German IT sector from Pakistan, India and the Far East, among other states. In 1999 about one million people were displaced as a result of the Kosovo crisis.⁴ “Europe became grist for the mill of both those who would accept and those would restrict immigration.”⁵

^Should we let refugees migrate in the European Union or should we restrict immigration per se?  Do we treat refugees with dignity by shipping them to Muammar al-Ghaddafi’s hands? How can we reconcile the fundamental values we place on human rights and the simultaneous ill-treatment refugees receive at the hands of some European national governments? “Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster”⁶ of two global wars in the last century, our generation has an obligation to respect the inviolable human dignity of refugees. Instead of constructing a heavy Fortress to protect the European Union from international migration, industrialised and emerging nations ought to look into possibilities to increase living conditions in Africa and elsewhere.

Admittedly, this might sound a bit utopian given the scale of problems developing countries are facing day in and day out.  But such an ideal is supposed to build the fundamental unit, a long-term goal for the centre-left.  If the centre-left, the Labour Party, Partito Democratico and the Greens, focus more on a clearer role in combating wretched poverty in Africa, in regards to, for example, bad terms of trade, we would have a better understanding of the ground realities.  Ground realities, such as our industrial pollution and its contribution to the rise of sea-level, for instance, in the Maldives, could lead to careful formulation of policy alternatives, which would decrease migration in the long-run. However, the centre-right’s neo-liberal policies have failed to integrate wider issues on environment. I do though consider environmental policy of the industrialised world as one major point inextricably linked to international migration.  What is more, greater global climate crisis will most definitely increase people’s mobility around the globe.

Firstly, let us recall that migration is nothing new. Human history is a history of migration. For centuries people have moved long distances, settled in new places and taken the road again due to war, disease, political persecution, religious motivation and economic unease.  Migration and emigration are not new entries to our vocabulary books, though the current media tend to portray migration as a new phenomenon, gradually increasing over a span of the last three decades.

For centuries, people, particularly the Irish, who moved around the globe, experienced a mass emigration to the new world, that is to say North America.  The United States of America is a nation based on migration. In Europe, migration, from seasonal migration of farm labour to migration of trades, already existed before the nineteenth century. Changes in quantitative degrees occurred amid the vagaries of the Industrialisation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Intra-European or inter-continental migration, as much as the average distance of migration began to explode the geographical mobility.⁷

Withal, migrants clearly have shaped Europe as much as Europeans themselves.  Even though it is attached to Asia, depicted as a Christian place confronted by Islam, Europe defined itself as its own continent. Islam, namely the “otherness”⁸ to paraphrase Edward Said, promoted a self-identification for Europeans based on Christian heritage and common values which set the Arabo-Islamic world apart.

Nevertheless, issues on migration and asylum are among the most salient policy features in Europe today.⁹ Member states of the European Union are all affected by the flow of international migration.¹⁰ They are preoccupied with the social, economic and political consequences. Migrant workers from outside and also inside the European Union are often perceived as a “potential economic burden”¹¹.  Asylum seekers are portrayed as a threat to the national welfare.¹² It is hence no surprise that migration and asylum issues are controversial. Discourses among citizens, politicians, economists, civil and NGO activists are often contentious. Whilst economists regard skilled migration as absolutely necessary for the domestic labor market, the xenophobic far right across Europe simplifies problems of unemployment by solely blaming foreigners for social and economic ills.  Not only does the far-right Northern League in Italy fall into that category, but also the Swiss People’s Party, die Schweizerische Volkspartei, and the BNP in Britain manipulate anti-migration public sentiment for their own political purposes by avoiding any subtlety. All they do is magnify the dark sides of migration with incensed exaggeration. For them it is an easy game to play. They like to dramatise migration, yet they dramatically fail to look into the complexities of immigration: rise of refugees and its complex nexus with demographic developments and linkages built along with skills shortages and international trade etc.

In any case, the EU witnesses a high level influx of third country national (in short TCN) refugees.  Additionally, it experiences pressing socio-economic problems. Skills shortages in certain areas of the labor market are an economic concern, whereas a social concern is given by the ageing population in most EU member states.  Italy is a leading nation when it comes to wrinkles.  For years now, the mortality rate has exceeded the birth rate in this traditionally Roman Catholic country. The numbers are telling. One-fifth of the Italians are already over 65 (years of age).¹³ This makes Italy the second oldest state topped only by Japan. Italy’s demographical developments indicate a very low birth rate among European nations and the level of emigration and immigration from and to Italy is rather balanced, resulting in a stagnating population growth, which modestly vacillates at around 0.¹⁴ Generally, 2.0 children per woman is the magical population replacement number. Everything above would increase and everything below would decrease population.  Italy’s population growth rate was just 1.33, according to a Euro stat survey of 2004.  Isn’t such a number reason to be worried about it? The hustle and tussle of Berlusconi and Fini’s recent power play has neglected this issue, which is a pressing subject matter for Italy’s centre-right.  The centre-right politicians are busy with themselves. The centre-left ought to provide its own policy options in this crucial policy area. Until now, the political tendency was to either misuse migration for election campaigns or push this hot-button issue at supra-national EU level, but the EU does not remain inactive.

Against the backdrop of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement to Eastern Europe, the European Union has introduced tougher external border controls.  The member states’ cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs ¹⁵ has increasingly restricted access for non-EU migrants; third country nationals.  These common measures have strengthened the Fortress Europe and demographic and economic issues have led EU leaders to regulate migration by clearly preferring highly skilled non-EU nationals over low-skilled.

The author Gordon already prophesized in the early 1990s with his finale: “A key point about 1992 and the creation of a single Europe is that it will mean the virtual closure of the EC to non-EC nationals, the creation of what has come to be called Fortress Europe. The corollary of relaxing internal border controls, as numerous documents have made clear, is the strengthening of the external borders of the Community to stop the entry of non-EC nationals, particularly those from the Third World.”¹⁶

And yet his conclusion was written two decades ago.  What has changed is the regulation of migration which needs to be added to his perspective of a cordoned-off Fortress. EU’s asylum and migration policy has become highly selective.  It “encourage(s) skilled migration and discourage(s) illegal refugees“.¹⁷ Whilst the EU is expanding and strengthening the Fortress against undocumented, less-skilled migrants, it is also trying to attract highly skilled and economically highly beneficial migrants, needed to correct domestic skill shortages and also balance demographic changes.  This means that the EU Fortress remains inaccessible to low-skilled third country nationals (TCN), but the door of the Fortress is open to highly qualified members of the TCN.

Post-war boom years: migrants needed for economy

The time of economic miracle “Wirtschaftswunder“¹⁸in West Germany, for example, in 1950s and 60s, with average economic growth rates from 5 to 10 %¹⁹, was the beginning of the “Gastarbeiter“ ²⁰ (guest worker)  migration wave making their way to the prosperous Federal Republic of Germany.  Many migrants came from Turkey or were, in general, from an intra-European background, as from Italy.  West-Germany’s high economic growth rates meant extra labour force from other states was required. At that time the conservative Adenauer government in Bonn had only planned the temporary stay of the new migrant workers, but (West) Germany became one of the largest immigrant-receiving countries in the world.²¹ (West) Germany was politically unprepared for the final settlement of foreign workers in their state and presently faces difficulties to integrate some of the foreigners into the mainstream. Similar examples can be found in other Western European countries, such as the Netherlands and, since the 1990s, Italy also has become, slowly but surely, a migrant-receiving country, especially due to its location along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

The two “B”s on migration: burden or beneficial?

Do you remember the election poster of the right-wing Swiss People’s Party? Depicting four sheep, three white and one black, it caused controversy. Founded on the red flag with a white cross, one of the white sheep is kicking the black sheep out of the Swiss flag; that in a country whose economy is based on international investment and banking.

I have another flag to offer. The one which clearly shows the benefits that foreigners, either qualified or not, have brought to Europe. There is enough evidence that migrants have contributed substantially to the German²², Italian, French and British economies. This fact is important to keep in mind when it comes to EU’s AMP (asylum and migration policies) and the Fortress aspect. Even though some centre-right governments, as Mrs. Merkel’s administration in Berlin, denies that Germany and the like are countries of migration, Mehrländer cites studies which clearly demonstrate that the economic growth of the 1960s and also 1970s would not have been possible without immigrant labour.²³ Also, Italy has struggled to find the right tone and approach towards migration²⁴. According to the United Nations²⁵, more than 200 million migrant workers live throughout the world, 40.5 million of whom legally reside in the territory of the European Union.²⁶ Migrants legally residing in Italy (about 4 million people) now account for 7.1% of the population. These figures are too large to warrant a passive or individualistic approach: a single state cannot cope with such onerous figures.²⁷ How countries cope with these figures will form the part of the second essay.

To sum up EU’s migration policy illustratively here a metaphor: a big Fortress is constructed to seal off undesirable people from the Global South.  This fortress, however, has a big door, in Italian a “Porta”, which only opens to let in those migrants who are desirable for their economy. If, however, undesirable migrants, who fled their country of origin due to war and poverty, somehow manage to get into the EUROPEAN Fortress, then they will be kicked out and shipped back.

Increasing numbers of migrants are arriving in Western Europe from Africa, Asia and Latin America.  Consequently, “refugee migration”²⁸ has become a special policy concern for the EU and its member states.  This essay, therefore, has outlined and explained the reasons why the EU widens and deepens its Fortress: the rising influx of migration, dissolution of internal EU borders since the Single European Act of 1986 and EU citizenship, economic problems with high level unemployment and an increased level of xenophobia²⁹ from politics, media and the public generally.  These examples have suggested why the European Union and EU national governments have tried to tackle the “immigration problem”.³⁰ EU member states such as Germany, the UK and Italy are facing a conflict between an economically driven demand for labour migration and political pressures for restriction, for example, from the political far right such as Le Pen in France and Bossi in Italy.  We have seen, therefore, that in terms of migration the AMP of the EU is highly selective.  It pursues policies to manage migration.  It does not, as a result, move beyond the construction of the Fortress Europe.  By contrast, the establishment of Frontex (EU military border guards) and the discourse on refugee detention camp has built up the Fortress.  The AMP only complements the Fortress by attracting and welcoming skilled workers.³¹ The JHA’s rationale behind this policy is the conclusion that skilled workers have  a great beneficial potential to help the European economy (e.g. Italian economy) to remain competitive.³² The global financial crisis and the high level of unemployment³³ in the EU may lead to the idea that there are no job opportunities for new migrants.  This is misleading, as we have explained; many industrialised states such as Germany, France, Spain and Italy have a structural unemployment problem. There is a mismatch between job vacancy and special skills.  Millions of unemployed people need to be properly qualified to take the highly skilled job opportunities e.g. in Finance and IT sectors, otherwise their economic growth would slip down.  Domestic workers become redundant because “their old skills are obsolete.”³⁴ The structural changes in the European economy bring new challenges.  As such, the Fortress implies tight restrictions on those forms of low-skilled migration seen as a threat to the economy³⁵ whilst new parameters of skilled migration have been set in the 2008 EU immigration pact, which fits in many national aspects of AMP with the EU.  The central message of this EU³⁶ pact is that “it (contains) tough language on illegal immigration and good stuff on the importance of selective legal migration.”³⁷

In the second part we will discuss the militarisation of the EU borders, followed by another essay on the demographical shifts in Europe and the issue of brain gain and brain loss.

Bibliographical Notes

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In Shock Economy Naomi Klein underlines the consequences of neo-liberalist policies implemented by governments in case of distress and ‘unexpected’ crises. Making reference to the influence of Milton Friedman’s theories on American conservative policies, she illustrates how a shock is often considered a useful tool to erase some of the achievements of civil right movements and to rebuild an alternative social system, mainly based on private funding and enterprise.

Among the cases analyzed, Naomi Klein examines in particular the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the economy of Louisiana state. After the disaster, she points out, many state employees lost their jobs because local government did not receive any financial aid to restore the pre-hurricane system by the central institutions. Washington, indeed, preferred to develop a reconstruction policy focused on promoting the creation of private schools and hospitals, neglecting even the public sector of infrastructure

The situation of many European states today is of course different from the post-Katrina one, but the financial crisis that many of them are facing might reshape definitely their traditional social balance as well as determine their future economic development.

Cutting Education, Cutting the Future

The case of education is paradigmatic in this sense, since it has become one of the most targeted areas by European governments in their policies of cuts in public spending, even though it should be a strategic asset to fight the rampant development of Asian countries. But in countries like Italy or the UK, both led by conservative coalitions, the complexity of the crisis is allowing worried officials to cut indiscriminately in any politically expendable field.

Politicians justify their choices for cuts declaring that it is time to restore responsible policies, which in the past were too dominated by “ideological” perspectives. In the globalized world, they argue, education must necessarily be more tightly connected to the job market: this is not the time for “educational solidarity”. Opponents to these measures point out that indiscriminate education cuts will increase the fees for schooling and university courses and decrease the number of scholarships available, therefore negatively affecting social mobility and equality, key concepts in modern democracies. In addition, a system of funding that is more connected with private sectors and where the state is a peripheral player would probably let investments in the field of humanities drop.

The Sunset of Europe?

On the other hand, the growth of emerging economies, especially in Asia, suggests that the kind of white collar services which are now provided in Europe will increasingly move towards the Far East within the next few years just as industrial production has moved.

Analysts repeat that one of the tools that the European countries should use to fight their decline is investments in advanced research, aimed at maintaining the technological gap which at present distinguishes Europe from emerging countries. Data available shows that in the past years emerging economies have started to invest massively in education and research to fill the technological gap which still exists between them and the developed countries, suggesting that now it shouldn’t be the time for reducing funds in these fields.

The Bologna Process: (not so much) Towards a European Common Strategy in Education and Research

In 1999 the EU Member states officials signed the Bologna Declaration, starting the Bologna Process, a process of integration with the aim of making the EU economic area more competitive and harmonized in the field of education and research. Its purposes were confirmed and expanded in 2009 by the Leuven Communiqué, listing the priorities for the coming decade of European Higher education system:

• social dimension: equitable access and completion;
• lifelong learning;
• employability;
• student-centred learning and the teaching mission of higher education;
• education, research and innovation;
• international openness;
• mobility;
• data collection;
• multidimensional transparency tools;
• funding.

Among the goals already achieved by the Bologna process was the harmonization of the university system, which had to transform the original university study plan of each EU member state from 4 or 5 years of study into 3 + 2 module programmes.  Even though this project has been implemented, many European universities are dissatisfied with the new system because it seems to have only downgraded the level of student preparation and the quality of instruction.

It is not clear yet whether in its second decade the new targets of the Bologna process will succeed, as a brief survey of country reports already suggests. There is little or no balance, in fact, in the allocation of funds each country of the Euro zone plans for research, a difference that will have effects on the middle/long run economic performances of every single state.

But the policies of cuts in education and research could not only slowdown the response of economies to the economic crisis in general, making each country less competitive vis-à-vis the world at large including emerging economies. They may also affect the social and economic cohesion of the EU and its future development, undermining its role as a player in the world’s economy.

The American Lesson. What Perspectives for Europe?

Almost three decades of reductions of public spending in the educational system of the United States have increased poverty and inequality,making citizens at least less confident in state run institutions and seriously eroding the social cohesion at the same time.

It is possible that similar policies perpetrated by conservative coalitions in Europe will change or redefine in the middle/long run the social framework of many countries of the Old Continent. And a poorer educational system means inequality of opportunities, as well as less educated and poorer citizens. Is that the Europe we need?

After last year’s failure at the UN climate talks in Copenhagen, Cancun’s United Nations Climate Conference achieved some progress towards a low-carbon future and restored faith in the UN multilateral governance process.

Over 190 countries’ delegations gathered in Cancun, Mexico, on the 29^th November and on the 10^th of December for the 16^th Conference of the Parties (COP16) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the sixth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 6). The Kyoto Protocol is the current agreement which requires 40 industrialised countries to reduce their carbon emissions by 5% by 2012 according to 1990 levels. The US are the only industrialised country which did not ratify the protocol and also China – formally a developing country –  is not part to the agreement despite the fact that it has since then become the world major carbon emitter.

While the Copenhagen talks were expected to produce an all-encompassing agreement to succeed to the Kyoto Protocol and reached a dead end instead, lower expectations characterised this year’s climate talks, resulting in better, even if, fairly modest outcomes.

Cancun Agreements – how much progress has been made?

Well, the world is still far from a legally binding treaty to follow on the steps of the Kyoto Protocol and significant work is required to pave the way for a binding treaty to be adopted at the 2011 Conference of the Parties in Durban, South Africa. Some progress has, however, been made including the translation of most promises made under the voluntary Copenhagen Accord into formal UN decisions and the outline of new mechanisms to help address climate change.

Indeed, the Cancun Agreements officially recognised the objective of keeping the increase in global temperature to less than 2°C[i] above pre-industrial levels. Voluntary emissions cuts pledged by industrialised countries under the Copenhagen Accord are formally associated with the UN process even though they remain legally non-binding. Moreover, developing countries’ plans and mitigation actions to reduce emissions are encouraged and recognised within the multilateral process[ii]. However, while serious emissions cuts are required in the next decades if we are to keep temperature levels within the agreed limit, the Cancun package does not specify in greater detail the levels and means by which countries should reduce levels of green house gas emissions.

The Cancun package also reasserts the necessity to raise $30bn from wealthier countries to support climate action in developing countries up to 2012. Moreover, a Green Climate Fund[iii] is to be set up to raise and distribute $100bn from 2020 onwards, governed by a board with equal representation from developed and developing countries and to be administered by the World Bank. The fund, to be provided by industrialised countries, will support climate adaptation and mitigation projects as well as low-carbon development in the developing world. Developing countries, however, question the choice of the World Bank as the trustee (as demanded by the US, EU and Japan), which they perceive as an instrument of western foreign policy. In addition, the World Bank role still has to be clearly outlined.

As for binding cuts in emissions, the Parties meeting under the Kyoto Protocol agreed to continue negotiations with the aim of avoiding any gap between the first commitment period (up to 2012) and the second commitment period (still to be negotiated and applied from 2012 onwards). This is certainly one of the most impressive achievements of the Mexican presidency led by Ms Patricia Espinosa, the foreign secretary of Mexico. In fact, when the Cancun talks started Japan, Canada and Russia were among a number of countries which  refused to take part to the second commitment period. While the text provides reassurance on the likelihood of a second commitment period, it does not require countries to sign up, suggesting that to have both developed and developing countries to agree on its legal form and targets will prove difficult.

Decisions were also made regarding deforestation, climate change and technology transfer.

The Cancun Agreements outline the principles underlying the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) mechanism and set up a Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) work programme on policy approaches and positive incentives on related issues in developing countries[iv]. Moreover, the Conference established the Cancun Adaptation Framework[v] to allow better planning and implementation of adaptation projects in developing countries through increased financial and technical support. With the aim of supporting action on mitigation and adaptation, a Technology Mechanism[vi] together with a new technology executive board is created to boost technology development and transfer. While it remains to be seen how such processes will be implemented in practice, the Cancun Package formally lays out the principles for action to be taken.

A restored faith in multilateral climate governance but still a long way to go

Contrary to the 15^th Conference of the Parties which reached a dead-end in Copenhagen despite a voluntary accord agreed in extremis by 30 countries but not adopted by the Conference, the Cancun climate talks did result in a set of legal decisions adopted by the Parties on a consensual basis and constitutes a significant achievement in itself. In fact, a repeated failure at Cancun would have seriously damaged any prospects for the UN process to remain an adequate forum for climate negotiations at the global level. After Cancun, the UN process finds itself revived but more importantly, it gains new institutions and programmes that add grounds to international cooperation on climate change.

As for the negotiation process itself, Mexico, which hosted COP16, did a lot to reassure developing countries that their opinions were being heard and to reaffirm the UN principles of transparency and openness. The most decisive compromises were brought up by India, China and Brazil. India, in particular, played a major role in this negotiation and suggested that it would consider agreeing to mandated cuts at some point in the future. China made similar assertions towards the end of the conference, regarding an eventual possibility for voluntary emission cuts to be registered under the UNFCCC. On the contrary, the European diplomacy appeared rather paralysed and unable to take any leadership in the negotiation process. The US seem rather unlikely to make any significant commitment in terms of emission reduction, especially in light of recent changes in partisan representation in government entities, with the recent comeback of Republicans.

In the end, Bolivia was the only country to reject the Cancun package considering the 2°C limit too lax, the absence of new commitments to reduce emissions by developed countries which it wanted and the integration of principles agreed on in the Copenhagen Accord which Bolivia has always strongly opposed. Contrary to the Copenhagen talks where its rejections were backed up by other countries, in Cancun Bolivia ended up seating alone on the opposition bench without compromising the Cancun package adoption by consensus as required by the UN.

What comes next

Clearly, serious cuts in greenhouse gases emissions are required from both industrialised and developing countries in the next decade if we are to keep temperature levels within the agreed limit of 2°C according to pre-industrial levels. The difficulty in agreeing on post-2012 emission targets is critically heightened by the position of countries such as Japan, Canada and Russia which refuse to commit if countries such as the US, China and India do not agree on similar cuts. In addition, many other issues remain to be clarified, especially on the provision of funding from developed countries to support adaptation and mitigation projects as well as for technology transfer from the North to the South to expand. In this context, negotiations and concerted efforts in the coming months will most probably influence the next Conference of the Parties to be held in Durban, South Africa towards the end of 2011.

[i] Cancun Agreements – “Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention” p.2, available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php

[ii] Ibidem, p. 8

[iii] Ibidem, p.15

[iv] Ibidem, p.10-12 and Appendix II

[v] Ibidem, p. 3-4

[vi] Ibidem, p.16-20

15/12/2010

Round Up

The first fortnight of December has been a tumultuous one for the British and the Italian

governments. In Britain students fighting against the raise in tuition fees occupied universities

and took it to the streets of London shaking the British public opinion and the stability of the

coalition government. In Italy over the last two weeks it fell on university students to enliven the

disheartened Italian opposition but this was only an aside to the main story: Berlusconi narrowly

winning the vote of confidence in the lower house thanks to a handful of last-minute “repentances”

from the opposition and to the tactical abstention of a rebel group loyal to his former deputy,

Gianfranco Fini.

In the UK the government passed legislation to cut public teaching grants by 80% and raise

university tuition fees up to £ 9,000 (€ 10.600) a year. Governments can consider themselves

lucky when students are their first opponents in time of austerity. The student protest looks fairly

harmless but this time tuition fees happen to be an incredibly contentious issued for the junior

coalition partner, the Lib-Dem. After having campaigned for a decade against Labour tuition fee

rises (from 0 to £ 3,600 a year) all Lib-Dems signed an election pledge to oppose any increase

in tuition fees and Nick Clegg himself was photographed proudly showing his own signature.

Devised as a public demonstration of “Lib-Dem readiness to govern”, the coalition government

is dramatically weakening the Lib-Dem especially within their own constituency (dissatisfied

Labours, educated young students and professionals). Although tuition fee rise were backed by

the House of Commons, 21 out of 57 Lib-Dem MPs rebelled against the government and 8 more

abstained leaving many uncertainties about Nick Clegg leadership and on the stability of the

coalition government in the months to come. The Lib-Dem recently lost more than 15 points in the

polls and discontent within the party is expected to grow as more public sector redundancies will

come next year.

The Italian political climate is far more tense. After six months of bickering among (former)

allies, Silvio Berlusconi managed to fend off the parliamentary rebellion lead by Giafranco

Fini, now speaker of the lower House. Thanks to a handful of last minute unlikely repentances,

Berlusconi mustered the House 314 to 311 (out of 630) Although Berlusconi does not have a stable

enough majority to govern for another three years he is again the key playmaker and he will be

deciding how and when to call a general election. Even more importantly, Berlusconi can continue

to present himself as the only and undefeated rightwing Italian leader. The vote in Parliament

sparked student protests in Rome, some of witch degenerated into clashes with the police and

violent rioting. The last financial review (legge finanziaria) cut public funding to universities by

a flat 20% (over € 1,3 bn) and the hardship scholarship budget has been reduced from € 246 to 13

million in two years. The government has been struggling to get the reform thorough the lower

house and the student movement has been galvanised by a concrete possibility of success but it is

likely that the government will now show its determination in the Senate.

But what about the policies?

Following a period of budget austerity, both Italy and the UK have dramatically cut public spending

in Higher Education. The Italian government policy is, to put it bluntly, to cut public funding

without a specific strategy and let universities to cope with it or to die out slowly. Mr. Tremonti,

Italian Minister of Economy and Finance, kindly invited protesters to “make a sandwich with La

Divina Commedia”.

The British rise in tuition fee is part of a decade long process. Tony Blair introduced tuition fees in

1998 setting the cap at about £ 1,000 a year (tripled to over £ 3,000 in 2004), a rather unpopular

move even at the time. In the British system, however, no students pays upfront for the cost of its

undergraduate education (first 3 years). All students receive a government loan which covers tuition

fees and, depending on social background, also living expenses. Under the new proposed system

the government will slash higher education subsidises and students will have to take loans to cover

up to 9,000 a year for the most prestigious universities. As under the previous scheme, graduates

will be asked to repay their debt only when they earn more than £ 21,000 a year, this in order to

encourage access from low income students and protect graduates who follow low-income careers.

WRAP-UP

In a time of political tensions is easy, especially for opposition parties, to be carried by the events.

Ed Milliband dubbed the university fee rise as “an act of vandalism” but the Brown Independent

Review which put forward the current proposal was convened by Labourite Lord Mandelson and

the new plan involves only a change in size, not in structure from Labour’s reform. The political

question which confronts both the Italian and the British left is whether graduates should be

asked to pay (although through subsided loans) for the full cost of their education. Not less but

also no more than that.

In 2008, for the first time in history, the proportion of the world’s population living in urban areas reached 50% and, if current trends will continue, as predicted by the most recent estimates made by UN-HABITAT (2009), in 2030 the share will be equal to 60%, thus representing a total population of the cities doubling from two to four billion people. Accommodating these inhabitants will mean that the equivalent of seven new ten million person cities each year will be needed and that by 2025 the number of “megacities” (agglomerations of more than ten million inhabitants ), will raise to 27 compared to the 20 of today.

However, what seems to be more challenging about the on-going process of urbanization to which we are witnessing is, on the one hand, its rapidity and, on the other hand, that it will mainly occur in less developed countries (LDC). This will seriously challenge national governments in those countries that do not have the necessary infrastructure to receive such an enormous flow of people, thus exacerbating the growth of urban slums, with no public services like clean water, electricity, housing and transportation. Moreover, the continuing urbanization will also challenge the consumption of energy given the fact that, according to the World Energy Outlook (2009), cities represented the 2/3 of global energy consumption in 2006 and are expected to count for the ¾ by the year 2030, thus representing a severe sustainability issue.

Major responsible of this consumption will be lighting and heating for buildings, which are actually responsible for the 25% of total energy consumption, and transportation, which counts for the 13,5% of today’s consumption. Against this backdrop, the development of eco-friendly cities represents a priority to meet international goals in terms of CO2 emissions reduction. In fact, since cities’ high density makes it possible to achieve better results with the same level of action. Then, the challenge for policymakers in LDC will be twofold: adopting policies to increase cities’ sustainability and, at the same time, implementing the appropriate actions so as to curb CO2 emissions.

Thinking and planning a Smart City

The use of low carbon technologies to accelerate development and promote economic growth is often referred to as “leapfrogging”, meaning the implementation of a new and up-to date technology in an application area in which the previous version of that technology has not been deployed. Within this debate, leapfrogging could allow LDC to avoid locking themselves in hydrocarbon intensive technologies and infrastructures and immediately shift towards a low carbon paradigm.

Translating these theories into practice would mean, for LDC, taking prompt actions in order to plan their cities according to the concept of a “Smart City” defined as a city based on Smart Grids, on a new generation of buildings, on renewable resources and on new, low carbon, transport solutions capable to change the future energy paradigm.

The rationales for developing countries to plan a Smart City at an early stage are many, among those: the need to give their contribution in the fight of climate change, in order to achieve the international goals of avoiding a raise of the temperature above 2°C, to increase their competitiveness and growth, to fight energy poverty and to guarantee themselves the security of energy supply. Finally, another push in starting to immediately plan Smart Cities comes from the fact that IEA (2009) has estimated that each year of delayed action would add 336bn of euro to the investment needed globally in clean energy from 2010-2030 .

The first step in the path towards a Smart City is represented by Smart Grids, defined as “an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users connected to it –generators, consumers, and those that do both- in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supply ”. The development of Smart Grids is essential in order to: • Guarantee the integration of renewable energy and distributed generation into the grid;

• Guarantee a more reliable infrastructure;

• Trigger demand reduction and improvements in energy efficiency;

• Allow the electrification of heat and transport.

Thanks to the benefits provided by the Smart Grids, LDC could better achieve the goals of reducing their emissions, improve their energy security and foster their economic growth. Moreover, LDC could achieve three types of economic gains. Firstly, by promoting small renewable and distributed generation, developing countries could avoid investing in big size power plant and in the all connected infrastructure necessary to transport energy for long distances. Secondly, they could better face the problem of frauds, which are very common in informal settlements. Finally, thanks to better efficiency, they could reduce the investment needed in extra capacity.

However, planning and moving toward the construction of Smart Cities will not be an easy task because of the huge investments in technical (buildings, networks), social and human capital. Indeed, many of the necessary communication, automation and grid technologies have already been proven and others are in the final stage of development. The most significant challenge will be one of cost and deployment, as the implementation of an holistic end-to-end smart grid will require the dramatic scaling up of investments and the design of new market structure and new regulatory mechanisms. In order to meet these challenges, action will be needed at all stages of government. It should involve the broader spectrum of stakeholders, and it should engage the surrounding macro-environment.

Within this context, the role of public private partnership (PPP) could be crucial in designing and implementing efficient solutions, as the main outcomes of PPP are transferring technology and management efficiency to public services. PPP could also allow leveraging private sector capital, although they cannot entirely solve the problem of extending basic services to the poor while, at the same time, curbing emissions. Therefore, public money is still needed to invest in human and social capital. In this respect, a different range of other measures can be deployed in order to raise the necessary funds. Some examples are:

• Progressively increase land and property taxes;

• Tax the capital gains on land and buildings streaming from public investments and regulation changes;

• Use carbon finance, in order to sell emissions rights to the north and, more generally, to benefit from future north-south transfers aimed at lowering the cost of curbing emissions and sharing responsibilities;

Finally, a major role will expect to regulators, which will need to design the appropriate framework of incentives to foster the investment of national and multinational firms and to promote the involvement of citizens.

07/12/2010

Round Up

Two dramatic and unforeseen events are disrupting British citizens’ daily activities and diverting their attention from the realm of government and politics, something we can and ought to control, to a narcotic observation of events that are beyond our command: nature and gossip. Let’s be frank: people are addicted to these two forces. Social life depends upon them, in a way. The reason why we are so fanatical about is twofold: our total incapacity to regulate and delimit them and the sense of community awakening as a result of a direct or indirect involvement. It’s part of our DNA, to eagerly seek what we can’t handle.

As the first decade of the 2000s draws to a close, the emergence of the “W factors”, Weather and Wikileaks, in British politics reveals how self-contradictory our democratic societies and how vulnerable we are to any attempt, normally conveyed by the media, to hijack our participation in politics (the essence of Democracy, according to Tocqueville) and our interest in the res publica.

Weather is a natural factor with significant micro socio-political fallout. We might despise energetic consumption affecting climate change and do our best to counter it, but in our inner nature we are compelled by extreme weather conditions. Annoyed when finding ourselves grounded at airports and railway stations, thrilled when media reports of a “snowmageddon” in Scotland shakes our boring routine as the Die Hard series used to jiggle a rainy Wednesday night. The truth is: we fancy it, as long as it does not threatens our safety and we are pretty much sure that is not turning into a natural disaster. The result is under our eyes: impressive media coverage eclipsing any other domestic or international, political or economic news, with the exception of the exception of England missing out the 2018 World Cup.

Wikileaks is a political factor with minor social and significant macro political fallout. The first batch of 250.000 US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks in the past few weeks do not hold the same meaning for political élites and ordinary people. The two categories are affected in two very different ways. For the former, the “leaks” represent the first case of cyber threat menacing global security by non-military and non-material means. They constitute a direct attack to one of the pillars of national sovereignty and a core principle of interstate relations – diplomatic secrecy. While Wikileaks constitutes a serious concern for national diplomacies, the whistle blowing acquires a totally different meaning for public opinions. Documents provide an extraordinary amount of material that national media can use in many different ways: malicious portraits of leaders, revelations of mutual suspicion among people and organizations, espionage are broadcasted to appease gossipmongers’ appetite. We did not need the leaks to realize that Mr Berlusconi is “feckless, vain and ineffective as a modern leader”. But recognizing who the sinner is, is far more interesting that knowing what the sin was.

While we should not – or not necessarily – play down these two factors, it is important to recall that overplaying them ought not shade other important issues that are shaping UK’s future. The spending review presented by Chancellor George Osborne on 20 October 2010 fixes spending budgets for each Government department up to 2014-2015. Presented by the Coalition Government as a necessary measure to bring the UK economy “back from the brink”, the scale of the reform contained in the 2010 spending review is impressive as cuts are the deepest since the Second World War. Cuts hit Education, Welfare reform and Defence particularly hard.

Education: On Thursday 9th December, MPs in Westminster will vote for an increase in tuition fees put forward by the Coalition Government that is to modify – radically the education sector in the years to come. Cuts to public funding to higher education, accompanied by the highly controversial plan to raise the cap on tuition fees above the current level of £3,290 a year, have brought mass protests throughout the country, with many universities being occupied across the UK (See Glance_4).

Welfare: The 2010 spending review is the biggest shake-up in welfare since the 1940s. Plans for welfare reform to reduce public spending mark a key moment for both the Coalition and Britain. Main candidates for cuts are middle-class, out-of-work and child benefits, a contentious plan that has been explicitly called into question by the opposition leader Ed Miliband during his first PMQs speech. While government officials are confident that scrapping benefits and replacing them with a single universal credit is a necessary simplification of British welfare and is to make working people better off, Labour says that a precondition for the reform to be successful is that jobs should be available to ensure people get into work.

Defence: the strategic defence review presented by the Government mid-October unveils significant armed forces cuts, with defence spending to fall by 8% in four years and £4.5bn savings at the Ministry of Defence, including a reduction of civilian staff by 25,000 by 2015. Prime Minister Cameron said UK will meet NATO’s requirement of spending 2% of GDP on defence and continue to have the 4th military in the world. But the RAF and navy are to loose 5,000 jobs each, the army 7,000, and the strategic blueprint of the review seriously undermines Britain’s capacity to effectively address security needs in the years ahead.

Wrap-up

Beyond and besides the impressive media coverage of the “W factors” (Weather and Wikileaks) in the last two weeks, the debate over the 2010 spending review is a major political challenge that will deeply affect UK’s citizens lives in the medium-long term. Choosing the right path to recovery is a priority for Britain. If the Coalition Government holds the political accountability to fulfill reforms, the opposition and civil society have the historical responsibility to prevent the executive from going in the wrong direction. This requires active participation in politics by the citizens and effective opposition in parliament by their representatives.

Ed Miliband is right when saying that Labour party must do more than wait for the government to “screw up”. His vision of the Labour as a campaigning force, a movement beyond the New Labour, reaching out people (namely the “squeezed middle”) and standing up for their hopes and aspirations is without a doubt the good approach to set out overhaul of the party after defeat. But, as shown by his speech to the Labour party’s national policy forum last week, morality does not necessarily pay off in politics. Finding a new identity rooted on idealism and morality – Labour as “a force for good”? – must not go to the detriment of practical policy formulation and proposals. The bitter truth is: Ed is not impressing as a Leader, nor Labour as an opposition party. Despite initial fervor following the leadership election – granted outside the House of Commons – and encouraging public support to the project of a “new generation for change”, now the wind is changing. From the BBC to the Guardian, the media are less and less enthusiastic of a Labour leader who took an inexplicably long paternity leave and whose political strategy is ill defined at best. In his BBC Newslog,  Nick Robinson denounces Ed’s focus on the squeezed “middle” as a deliberately vague and questions the exact reach – and potential political outcome – of what he ironically labels as the squeezed “muddle”. Not an isolated comment. Most of the reactions after the national policy forum were mild when not adverse.

Labour is at a crossroad. Its leader, Ed Miliband, is getting busy reshaping the party identity to rebuild a widespread coalition of support after the shrinking of the New Labour. But contingency, and short-term policy action, matter too. In our society, people’s hopes and aspirations grow fast. Politics and politicians must keep up. Labour must act both as a “force for good”, shaping a new identity for progressive politics in the long term, and a “contingent force”, showing its capacity to creatively and pragmatically address urgent policy issues.

I call this “the Wilson factor”: the capacity of Labour’s leader to take over a dispirited party, make it a “natural party for government” and, at the same time, unite it under a shared identity and principles. Harold Wilson is the most famous example of a leader who was able to achieve this almost impossible mission. The “Wilson factor”, merging short and long term policy priorities as well as an inevitable process of identity reconstruction, will impact not just on the faculty of Labour to survive the storm, but also on Britain’s ability to avoid the economic and social crash and implement a full, sustainable recovery.