by Sohail Nazir – LFIT expert on immigration issues
He has always considered himself G.W. Bush’s junior sheriff, always willing to take care of nearby countries and conflicts of the wide southern Pacific Ocean. Well-behaved, married, conservative with Christian values. Who else could this be other than John Howard, the former Australian prime minister?
You might laugh on the sofa and wonder what the point is of remarking on a former head of government and even one who sided with Bush and his illegal war on Iraq? Well, I have nothing to offer against such a response. In fact, you are right.
Yet, when glancing over a pile of crumpled Australian morning papers dating some years back, I realised a spectre was haunting Europe: the spectre of John Howard. Howard’s policies on migration leant remarkably towards human rights violation. Unprecedented for a Rechtsstaat, in which the state ought to protect human dignity, he detained foreigners on far-off isolated Pacific Islands.
This spectre inexorably swept to Europe and detention camps subsequently became the buzzword. A debate ensued throughout this continent. Proud of the achievements of the Magna Charta and the Geneva Refugee Convention, Western Europe suddenly assembled a political will, namely, to quasi arrest refugees.
With about 40 million foreign refugees (Schmelz, A. 2006), roughly 8 million illegal immigrants in the domains of the European Union (Financial Times. 2008), public climate towards asylum seekers is one of growing hostility. This hostility is fuelled by right-wing populists. In the wake of Tunisians arriving on the Italian island of Lampedusa, Italian Interior Minister, Maroni, hyperbolically spoke of a “biblical exodus” (Donadio, R. and Daley, S. 2011). He even seriously suggested sending troops to Tunisia to halt illegal immigration. It was a diplomatic faux-pas, deemed to fail from its very outset. After all, which sovereign nation-state voluntarily invites foreign troops onto their soil?
Learning lessons from Uncle Howard, Maroni’s hyperbolism is revealing, for his government co-operated with Tunisia’s ousted dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. An accord was signed. Accordingly, Ben Ali’s regime received financial incentives to step up obstacles to would-be illegal immigrants. Seemingly, that accord has become invalid since Ben Ali had to relinquish the reins of power as result of the recent revolution in Tunisia.
It is not bad news that such bilateral agreements have become null and void because some reports do suggest mistreatments done to would-be migrants. For example, a report concealed that “electric shock batons were used to force migrants off the boats in Libya” (Donadio, R. and Daley, S. 2011), another state with a poor record on human rights. Similar allegations have been leveled against other regimes, which co-operated with the EU before some of them, quite recently, started crumbling.
That human beings cannot be regarded as illegal is an understandable reminder often echoed from non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch. They call into question some EU national governments’ de facto treatment of refugees as criminals. Their treatment is not fair; it is based on prejudice and is stigmatized.
Ignoring criticism, European leaders (including some social democrats) unscrupulously started co-operating with dictatorial regimes, such as Morocco, Tunisia and also Ghaddafi’s Libya. For the latter, Berlusconi developed a bizarre fondness (before the landmark uprisings), culminating in kissing the Colonel’s hand. Indeed, one can easily see a double standard deployed by western states in dealing with human rights. The very recent political insurgency in Libya resulted in western-led airstrikes against the brutal dictatorship in the name of human rights, whereas, just a few months ago, human rights violation was not a supreme concern and consequently a rallying cause of action.
At that time, EU national leaders were learning lessons from Australian Howard. In a similar fashion to Australia, they have been interested in setting up de facto prisons for refugees, thus treating migrants as convicted criminals. This went hand in hand with active help from Colonel Gaddafi and other dictators on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. What is more, this disparaging treatment is confirmed by the fact that children were not spared.
Such off-shore camps were first discussed at an EU summit of interior ministers in Scheveningen in 2004. Based on this, three critical points have to be discussed: firstly, migrants who try to seek refuge from war or other disasters are cut off from the basic principle that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from prosecution” (Art. 14, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Secondly, their destiny is often subject to randomness by third countries, which have poor records on human rights, for example, Morocco and Libya. Thirdly, most asylum cases would go unnoticed by the public as they are outside the EU borders. NGOs did also report about human rights violation in similar camps established by Australia.
Who is legal and who is illegal? The answer does not have any moral basis because there is a certain level of arbitrariness in this division between illegal and legal refugees. This peculiar arbitrariness, a politically motivated selection of migrants, is underscored by EU’s asylum and migration policies. And this is demonstrated by the European Union’s introduction of a so-called Blue card scheme. According to this, migrants rather ought to fit neatly into the economic frame, solely contributing to the well-being of the EU labour market. In order to remain competitive, it is necessary to resort to solutions tackling the mismatch of unqualified domestic workers to the demand of increasingly high skills in the booming service sector.
This selection leads us to the public sector economists as they have since portrayed migration in two faces. Researching on market failures and imperfect competition in communities, they illustrate the endless game of costs and benefits. Whether skilled laborers or not, new individuals in a new community may increase the tax base, making secretaries of the treasury deliriously happy. But to flip the coin the other way, they may also strain the increasing demand on public services, infrastructure and housing etc. (Stiglitz, J.E. 2000. p. 737).
This rather aloof factor calculation crunched by some economists, dividing migration into costs and benefits, does bear consequences: a European Fortress has been constructed. The island of the rich man is protected from the poor masses of the South. This costs and benefits calculation has since gained a new dynamic. Just as competition is the crucial component of microeconomics, so is selection for the EU migration and asylum policy.
Whilst the EU has gradually widened, edged and stepped up alertness around her Fortress keeping away uninvited migrants, it has left a protected doorway open for qualified migrants. They are welcome to enter the rich man’s gate. No doubt, we need them. After all, they correct the mismatch in the EU domestic market. Not only are we less willing to settle down and have children, we are also in the midst of an educational crisis. Our domestic labour force is not sufficiently trained to meet the increasing standards of job openings that require high-level qualifications in the growing service sector and, moreover, not prepared to take low-paid jobs e.g. in farming. This mismatch leads to high levels of unemployment in Western Europe. The jobs are there. The people qualified for them are not.
As a consequence, we easily indulge in a culture of brain gain and brain loss. With lucrative job offers we try to gain the brainiest people from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Qualified third country nationals are a treasure for their own country of origin. They could contribute enormously to their developing countries’ economies. But those people are invited over to Europe, lured by the European blue card.
A bizarre game is played which former EU Justice Commissioner Frattini sugarcoated as a brain circulation. To him the Blue card would also be beneficial to the country of origin. Life-long contacts would be made as well as foreign experience. True, but the fact remains, the EU is engaged in a brain gain-brain loss policy.
In conclusion, the recent EU’s asylum and migration policies are based on arbitrary selection criteria, co-operation with doubtful regimes and militarisation. We have witnessed that European countries have become states of selective immigration. Once more, growth-driven, neo-liberally framed, EU economic policies deride humanitarianism and human welfare. European states pursue competitive advantage. On the one hand they open their domestic economies to international migration, while on the other hand internal political forces drive them to seal off the borders. Leading to this antagonistic dynamic, EU national governments commence to manage migration. Such regulation solely follows their economic interests. They encourage certain streams, whilst stemming others. The EU migration policy clearly differentiates between highly educated professionals and low skilled migrants in order to compete with the US and the emerging economies. The low skilled migrants are perceived as a burden (Erel, U. 2009, p. 3). Stemming these is a doubtful practice. Detention camps outside the EU put these undesired migrants in de-facto confinements. Unprotected migrants are left at the mercy of dictators. John Howard’s migration policies are therefore wrong. They are against the fundamental values upon which the European Union is based. Being human cannot be illegal. Everyone seeking refuge has the right to make her or his case be heard. That is why treating a refugee or an asylum seeker as a criminal is unjust. This EU policy approach of selection criteria and Uncle Howard’s detention camps are cracked at several places; making a hard felt hat much too worse to wear.
Nota Bene
EU migration policy is that complex and complicated that short policy essays cannot encapsulate everything. The next policy essay on migration will again be a continuation. I will again critically look at the regulation of migration this time by analysing EU’s regional protection programmes. This will be accompanied by an interview I have conducted in Valencia of a migrant who travelled across Europe in search of a better future. It is designed to open our eyes by shedding light on the view migrants have on Europe. A brief article on David Cameron’s migration speech will offer the other side of the coin.
Bibliography
Associated Press. 9-10/04/2011. “Italy and France agree on handling Tunisian migrants”. In International Herald Tribune. Global Edition of New York Times, p. 3.
Donadio, R. and Daley, S. 9/3/2011. “Revolts Raise Fear of Migration in Europe”. In International Herald Tribune. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/europe/10europe.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=migration&st=cse accessed on 20/03/2011.)
Erel, U. 2009. “Qualifikation von Migrantinnen – eine Frage der Bürgerrechte?“ In Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 26th Oktober. Vol. 44., p. 3-6
German Basic Law. 1999. http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm accessed on 15/02/2011.
Harding, J. 2000. The Uninvited. Refugees at the Rich Man’s Gate. London: Profile Books and the London Review Books.
Hayter, T. 2004. Open Borders. The case against immigration controls. London: Pluto Press.
Schmelz, A. 2006. Network Migration in Europe. http://www.migrationeducation.org/17.0.html accessed on 24/03/2011.
Stiglitz, J.E. 2000. Economics of the Public Sector. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company.
The United Nations. UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a14 accessed on 14/02/2011.
picture by CaGi
By Chiara Benassi
PhD Candidate at LSE, Department of Management
Since December 23, 2010, the FIAT plant at Mirafiori (Turin) is no longer covered by the national collective agreement. Instead, a special agreement was signed by two of the three metalworker trade unions, FIM-CISL and UILM, and then ratified by a referendum among the workers themselves. The third, biggest and most representative union, FIOM-CGIL, refused to sign and a clause of the agreement now excludes it from the representation in the plant[i].
Both the content of the agreement and the modalities for negotiation are highly disputable: under the threat of closing the plant, employees accepted toughened working conditions such as the introduction of 10-hour and night shifts, the reduction of break time and sick leaves and the restriction of strike rights.
This article will discuss the meaning and the implications of FIAT CEO Sergio Marchionne’s landmark industrial relations strategy marking the end of national collective bargaining. By doing so, it will draw a parallel between recent developments in industrial relations in Italy and Germany, so as to show the consequences of collective bargaining erosion on the basis of the evidence arising from the German case.
Germany and Italy: two systems of industrial relations at a crossroad?
Over the last fifteen years, Germany has experienced a fast decline of sectoral collective bargaining in favor of decentralization. Therefore, the German experience provides a good case to assess the impact of this new phenomenon.
Collective bargaining coverage among employees shrunk from 76% (Western Germany) and 63% (Eastern Germany) in 1998[ii] to 56% and 38% in 2009[iii]. Since the mid-1990s, plant-level agreements have proliferated as a result of the enactment of the so-called “opening clause”, authorizing the opt-outs of national agreement. Moreover, additional “pacts for employment and competitiveness” have been signed at the plants level, which also depart from the standards bargained at national level and reduce total compensation for workers.[iv]
In Italy, collective bargaining coverage is estimated around 80%. Since the 1990s, however, a progressive decentralization can be observed. In 1993 a tripartite agreement between the government, the employers’ organization Confindustria, and the three confederal unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL) formalized the company-level bargaining, introducing a new representative body for unions and workers and specifying the issues to be negotiated – such as pay enhancements related to company productivity and performance[v]. The agreement signed in 2009 between the government and the two national trade unions, CISL and UIL, allows the application of opening clauses in cases where the company is under restructuring or if employment creation and economic growth can thereby be promoted[vi].
In Germany (and in Italy as well) the membership in the employers’ organization is voluntary, which implies that the coverage of the collective agreements bargained between unions and employers’ organizations at sectoral level is also optional. Therefore, companies have progressively dropped it, exploiting the exit option from the national collective bargaining system[vii]. The opt-outs have been so frequent that since 2006 companies have been given the option to join the employers’ organization without being covered by the national collective agreement (Ohne Tarifbindung – Mitgliedschaft). This phenomenon recalls the recent events between FIAT and Confindustria (the Italian employers’ organization): following Sergio Marchionne’s announcement that FIAT was to leave Confindustria, President of Confindustria Emma Marcegaglia made public the call for a new role of the organization, which would only provide services and political representation to the members, thus leaving to companies the bargaining of wages and working conditions[viii].
The impact of bargaining decentralization on income in Germany
Germany has often been referred to as a positive model in the public debates and articles around the Mirafiori issue, and, quite interestingly, from both those who were pro and against the agreement. This is not surprising: Germany is at the moment the leading economy in Europe with a GDP growth of 2.2% in August 2010[ix]. The export-oriented metal sector is the driving force of German economy. Salaries are much higher for German metal workers than for their Italian colleagues, the former earning a gross monthly salary of around 1,900€ (second wage level)[x], whereas the latter earn 650€ less[xi]. Such success is also attributed to the flexibility of the German economic model, which the abovementioned decentralization of the last decade has contributed to.
However, the GDP growth rate alone does not tell the whole story about Germany. In the metal sector, salaries are high but that should not be attributed to the sole process of decentralization of bargaining and to the proliferation of company level agreements. Salaries are mainly set through national collective agreements, which are negotiated between the employers’ association and the powerful union IG-Metall and cover 65% of the sector (in 2007)[xii]. A few companies, such as the often-cited Volkswagen, pay over the sectoral collective agreement. Nonetheless, the company-level salaries do not result from a kind concession of the employer, but from the bargaining between the management and the works council, which has strong information and co-decisional rights (Mitbestimmung) set by law.
According to reports and academic analyses, decentralization of bargaining is generally associated with inequality and low pay[xiii] and Germany is no exception. Indeed, according to the OECD, “since 2000, income inequality and poverty have grown faster in Germany than in any other OECD country”[xiv], and the declining of sectoral collective bargaining is considered one of the main causes[xv]. The figures below illustrate the recent wage development in Germany and cast some shadows on the German “economic miracle”. Figure 1 shows that Germany is the only EU country where the real wage growth has been negative between 2000 and 2008. Figure 2 compares the size of the low-pay sector in different OECD countries in 2006, showing that Germany follows the US with the second largest low-wage sector (calculated as percentage of low-paid workers on the total workforce).
Source: http://www.boeckler.de/32015_92684.html
Source: Schulten 2010[xvi]
Lessons for Italy
If bargaining decentralization had controversial effects in Germany, this trend raises even more questions with regards to Italy, where the power of workers and unions is limited. Workers’ representation at company level in Italy is much weaker than in Germany, as the representation bodies (Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie-RSU) have less information and bargaining rights than German works councils. In addition to this, Italian unions are more fragmented than German unions and this could lead to downward competition between concurring company-level agreements. Therefore, bargaining decentralization could have even more serious effects on income distribution in Italy than in Germany.
As a matter of fact, Sergio Marchionne’s opting out is not likely to remain an exception and other companies will probably exit the national collective agreements. This scenario raises concerns not only, and not particularly, for the metal sector but for the wider economy. The metal sector would probably maintain decent pay levels and working conditions even with a lower coverage of the national collective agreements, given the relatively high unionization and the developed social dialogue. However, the same logic cannot be assumed for other sectors, such as the service sector, where union density is low and social dialogue structures are not in place.
In January 2011, Fincantieri withdrew from the national collective agreement in Genoa and Gorizia. Trying the difficult business of fortune telling, it can be plausibly argued that Fincantieri is only the first victim of the “Marchionne effect”.
[i] Il Post (27.12.2010). “Che Cosa C’ E’ nell’Accordo di Mirafiori.” Retrieved 25.02.2011, from http://www.ilpost.it/2010/12/27/spiegazione-accordo-fiat-mirafiori/.
[ii] EIRO (2010). “Germany. Industrial Relations Profile.” Retrieved 02/03/2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/germany_4.htm.
[iii] Vogel, S. (2009). “Assessing Employee Representation and Collective Bargaining Coverage.” Retrieved 02/03/2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/05/articles/de1005029i.htm.
[iv] Addison, J. T., A. Bryson, et al. (2009). The Extent of Collective Bargaining and Workplace Representation: Transitions between States and their Determinants. A Comparative Analysis of Germany and Great Britain. Discussion Paper No. 4502. Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labour.
[v] EIRO (2009). “Italy. Accordo 23 Luglio 1993.”. Retrieved 26.02.2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/ITALY/AGREEMENTOF23JULY1993-IT.htm.
[vi] Pedersini, R. (2009). “Cgil Refuses to Sign Agreement on Collective Bargaining Reform.” Retrieved 23.02.2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/02/articles/it0902059i.htm.
[vii] Addison, J. T., A. Bryson, et al. (2009). The Extent of Collective Bargaining and Workplace Representation: Transitions between States and their Determinants. A Comparative Analysis of Germany and Great Britain. Discussion Paper No. 4502. Bonn, Institute for the Study of Labour.
[viii] Corriere della Sera (21.01.2011). “Intervista ad Emma Marcegaglia – “Cambio la Confindustria. E Dico Sì alla Partecipazione dei Lavoratori agli Utili” – Marcegaglia: Rappresentanza e Contratti, è Ora di Riformare la Confindustria.” Retrieved 20.02.2011, from http://rassegnastampa.mef.gov.it/mefeconomica/View.aspx?ID=2011012117686933-2.
Il Sole 24 Ore (22.01.2011). “Imprenditori D’Accordo con Marcegaglia: Pronti a Contratti Aziendali e a una Confindustria più Snella.” Retrieved 20.02.2011, from http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/economia/2011-01-21/imprenditori-accordo-marcegaglia-pronti-224449.shtml?uuid=AaV07m1C.
[ix] Financial Times (19.08.2011). “German Economic Growth Set to Hit 3%.” Retrieved 22.02.2011, from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d164d0da-aba5-11df-9f02-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1GacqYUQz.
[x] The second level has been chosen because the first level covers only the trainees in Germany.
[xi] The salary for German workers is an approximation of the salaries set by collective agreement in different Bundslaender in March, 2010 (Source: WSI-Tarifarchiv:http://www.boeckler.de/549_108038.html, download on 11.03.11).
The source for the salary of Italian metal workers is the Contratto Collettivo Nazionale del Lavoro, signed between Federmeccanica, FIOM, FIM and UILM in January, 2008.
[xii] Vogel, S. and B. Kraemer (2010). “Representativeness of the European Social Partner Organisations: Metal Sector – Germany.” Retrieved 20/01/2011, from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0911017s/de0911019q.htm.
[xiii] Blau, F. D. and L. M. Kahn (1996). International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: Institutions versus Market Forces, National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
Katz, H. C. and O. Darbishire (2000). Converging Divergences. Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems. Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press.
European Commission (2008). Industrial Relations in Europe 2008. Brussels, Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
[xiv] OECD (2008). Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. Germany: Country Note.
[xv] Keune, M. (2009). Introduction. Wages and Wage Bargaining in Europe. B. Galgoczi: 7-27.
Bosch, G., K. Mayhew, et al. (2010). Industrial Relations, Legal Regulations and Wage Setting. Low Wage in the Wealthy Work. J. Gautié and J. Schmitt. New York, Russel Sage Publications: 91-146.
[xvi] Schulten, T. (2010). Deutschlands lohnpolitische Sonderrolle in Europa. Tarifpolitische Tagung. W.-u. S. I. (WSI). Duesseldorf, 21-22 Sept. 2010.
Glance n.4 by Umberto Marengo picture by Matt Dinnery
15/12/2010
The first fortnight of December has been a tumultuous one for the British and the Italian
governments. In Britain students fighting against the raise in tuition fees occupied universities
and took it to the streets of London shaking the British public opinion and the stability of the
coalition government. In Italy over the last two weeks it fell on university students to enliven the
disheartened Italian opposition but this was only an aside to the main story: Berlusconi narrowly
winning the vote of confidence in the lower house thanks to a handful of last-minute “repentances”
from the opposition and to the tactical abstention of a rebel group loyal to his former deputy,
Gianfranco Fini.
In the UK the government passed legislation to cut public teaching grants by 80% and raise
university tuition fees up to £ 9,000 (€ 10.600) a year. Governments can consider themselves
lucky when students are their first opponents in time of austerity. The student protest looks fairly
harmless but this time tuition fees happen to be an incredibly contentious issued for the junior
coalition partner, the Lib-Dem. After having campaigned for a decade against Labour tuition fee
rises (from 0 to £ 3,600 a year) all Lib-Dems signed an election pledge to oppose any increase
in tuition fees and Nick Clegg himself was photographed proudly showing his own signature.
Devised as a public demonstration of “Lib-Dem readiness to govern”, the coalition government
is dramatically weakening the Lib-Dem especially within their own constituency (dissatisfied
Labours, educated young students and professionals). Although tuition fee rise were backed by
the House of Commons, 21 out of 57 Lib-Dem MPs rebelled against the government and 8 more
abstained leaving many uncertainties about Nick Clegg leadership and on the stability of the
coalition government in the months to come. The Lib-Dem recently lost more than 15 points in the
polls and discontent within the party is expected to grow as more public sector redundancies will
come next year.
The Italian political climate is far more tense. After six months of bickering among (former)
allies, Silvio Berlusconi managed to fend off the parliamentary rebellion lead by Giafranco
Fini, now speaker of the lower House. Thanks to a handful of last minute unlikely repentances,
Berlusconi mustered the House 314 to 311 (out of 630) Although Berlusconi does not have a stable
enough majority to govern for another three years he is again the key playmaker and he will be
deciding how and when to call a general election. Even more importantly, Berlusconi can continue
to present himself as the only and undefeated rightwing Italian leader. The vote in Parliament
sparked student protests in Rome, some of witch degenerated into clashes with the police and
violent rioting. The last financial review (legge finanziaria) cut public funding to universities by
a flat 20% (over € 1,3 bn) and the hardship scholarship budget has been reduced from € 246 to 13
million in two years. The government has been struggling to get the reform thorough the lower
house and the student movement has been galvanised by a concrete possibility of success but it is
likely that the government will now show its determination in the Senate.
But what about the policies?
Following a period of budget austerity, both Italy and the UK have dramatically cut public spending
in Higher Education. The Italian government policy is, to put it bluntly, to cut public funding
without a specific strategy and let universities to cope with it or to die out slowly. Mr. Tremonti,
Italian Minister of Economy and Finance, kindly invited protesters to “make a sandwich with La
Divina Commedia”.
The British rise in tuition fee is part of a decade long process. Tony Blair introduced tuition fees in
1998 setting the cap at about £ 1,000 a year (tripled to over £ 3,000 in 2004), a rather unpopular
move even at the time. In the British system, however, no students pays upfront for the cost of its
undergraduate education (first 3 years). All students receive a government loan which covers tuition
fees and, depending on social background, also living expenses. Under the new proposed system
the government will slash higher education subsidises and students will have to take loans to cover
up to 9,000 a year for the most prestigious universities. As under the previous scheme, graduates
will be asked to repay their debt only when they earn more than £ 21,000 a year, this in order to
encourage access from low income students and protect graduates who follow low-income careers.
In a time of political tensions is easy, especially for opposition parties, to be carried by the events.
Ed Milliband dubbed the university fee rise as “an act of vandalism” but the Brown Independent
Review which put forward the current proposal was convened by Labourite Lord Mandelson and
the new plan involves only a change in size, not in structure from Labour’s reform. The political
question which confronts both the Italian and the British left is whether graduates should be
asked to pay (although through subsided loans) for the full cost of their education. Not less but
also no more than that.
Glance N.3 by Giovanni Faleg
07/12/2010
Two dramatic and unforeseen events are disrupting British citizens’ daily activities and diverting their attention from the realm of government and politics, something we can and ought to control, to a narcotic observation of events that are beyond our command: nature and gossip. Let’s be frank: people are addicted to these two forces. Social life depends upon them, in a way. The reason why we are so fanatical about is twofold: our total incapacity to regulate and delimit them and the sense of community awakening as a result of a direct or indirect involvement. It’s part of our DNA, to eagerly seek what we can’t handle.
As the first decade of the 2000s draws to a close, the emergence of the “W factors”, Weather and Wikileaks, in British politics reveals how self-contradictory our democratic societies and how vulnerable we are to any attempt, normally conveyed by the media, to hijack our participation in politics (the essence of Democracy, according to Tocqueville) and our interest in the res publica.
Weather is a natural factor with significant micro socio-political fallout. We might despise energetic consumption affecting climate change and do our best to counter it, but in our inner nature we are compelled by extreme weather conditions. Annoyed when finding ourselves grounded at airports and railway stations, thrilled when media reports of a “snowmageddon” in Scotland shakes our boring routine as the Die Hard series used to jiggle a rainy Wednesday night. The truth is: we fancy it, as long as it does not threatens our safety and we are pretty much sure that is not turning into a natural disaster. The result is under our eyes: impressive media coverage eclipsing any other domestic or international, political or economic news, with the exception of the exception of England missing out the 2018 World Cup.
Wikileaks is a political factor with minor social and significant macro political fallout. The first batch of 250.000 US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks in the past few weeks do not hold the same meaning for political élites and ordinary people. The two categories are affected in two very different ways. For the former, the “leaks” represent the first case of cyber threat menacing global security by non-military and non-material means. They constitute a direct attack to one of the pillars of national sovereignty and a core principle of interstate relations – diplomatic secrecy. While Wikileaks constitutes a serious concern for national diplomacies, the whistle blowing acquires a totally different meaning for public opinions. Documents provide an extraordinary amount of material that national media can use in many different ways: malicious portraits of leaders, revelations of mutual suspicion among people and organizations, espionage are broadcasted to appease gossipmongers’ appetite. We did not need the leaks to realize that Mr Berlusconi is “feckless, vain and ineffective as a modern leader”. But recognizing who the sinner is, is far more interesting that knowing what the sin was.
While we should not – or not necessarily – play down these two factors, it is important to recall that overplaying them ought not shade other important issues that are shaping UK’s future. The spending review presented by Chancellor George Osborne on 20 October 2010 fixes spending budgets for each Government department up to 2014-2015. Presented by the Coalition Government as a necessary measure to bring the UK economy “back from the brink”, the scale of the reform contained in the 2010 spending review is impressive as cuts are the deepest since the Second World War. Cuts hit Education, Welfare reform and Defence particularly hard.
Education: On Thursday 9th December, MPs in Westminster will vote for an increase in tuition fees put forward by the Coalition Government that is to modify – radically the education sector in the years to come. Cuts to public funding to higher education, accompanied by the highly controversial plan to raise the cap on tuition fees above the current level of £3,290 a year, have brought mass protests throughout the country, with many universities being occupied across the UK (See Glance_4).
Welfare: The 2010 spending review is the biggest shake-up in welfare since the 1940s. Plans for welfare reform to reduce public spending mark a key moment for both the Coalition and Britain. Main candidates for cuts are middle-class, out-of-work and child benefits, a contentious plan that has been explicitly called into question by the opposition leader Ed Miliband during his first PMQs speech. While government officials are confident that scrapping benefits and replacing them with a single universal credit is a necessary simplification of British welfare and is to make working people better off, Labour says that a precondition for the reform to be successful is that jobs should be available to ensure people get into work.
Defence: the strategic defence review presented by the Government mid-October unveils significant armed forces cuts, with defence spending to fall by 8% in four years and £4.5bn savings at the Ministry of Defence, including a reduction of civilian staff by 25,000 by 2015. Prime Minister Cameron said UK will meet NATO’s requirement of spending 2% of GDP on defence and continue to have the 4th military in the world. But the RAF and navy are to loose 5,000 jobs each, the army 7,000, and the strategic blueprint of the review seriously undermines Britain’s capacity to effectively address security needs in the years ahead.
Wrap-up
Beyond and besides the impressive media coverage of the “W factors” (Weather and Wikileaks) in the last two weeks, the debate over the 2010 spending review is a major political challenge that will deeply affect UK’s citizens lives in the medium-long term. Choosing the right path to recovery is a priority for Britain. If the Coalition Government holds the political accountability to fulfill reforms, the opposition and civil society have the historical responsibility to prevent the executive from going in the wrong direction. This requires active participation in politics by the citizens and effective opposition in parliament by their representatives.
Ed Miliband is right when saying that Labour party must do more than wait for the government to “screw up”. His vision of the Labour as a campaigning force, a movement beyond the New Labour, reaching out people (namely the “squeezed middle”) and standing up for their hopes and aspirations is without a doubt the good approach to set out overhaul of the party after defeat. But, as shown by his speech to the Labour party’s national policy forum last week, morality does not necessarily pay off in politics. Finding a new identity rooted on idealism and morality – Labour as “a force for good”? – must not go to the detriment of practical policy formulation and proposals. The bitter truth is: Ed is not impressing as a Leader, nor Labour as an opposition party. Despite initial fervor following the leadership election – granted outside the House of Commons – and encouraging public support to the project of a “new generation for change”, now the wind is changing. From the BBC to the Guardian, the media are less and less enthusiastic of a Labour leader who took an inexplicably long paternity leave and whose political strategy is ill defined at best. In his BBC Newslog, Nick Robinson denounces Ed’s focus on the squeezed “middle” as a deliberately vague and questions the exact reach – and potential political outcome – of what he ironically labels as the squeezed “muddle”. Not an isolated comment. Most of the reactions after the national policy forum were mild when not adverse.
Labour is at a crossroad. Its leader, Ed Miliband, is getting busy reshaping the party identity to rebuild a widespread coalition of support after the shrinking of the New Labour. But contingency, and short-term policy action, matter too. In our society, people’s hopes and aspirations grow fast. Politics and politicians must keep up. Labour must act both as a “force for good”, shaping a new identity for progressive politics in the long term, and a “contingent force”, showing its capacity to creatively and pragmatically address urgent policy issues.
I call this “the Wilson factor”: the capacity of Labour’s leader to take over a dispirited party, make it a “natural party for government” and, at the same time, unite it under a shared identity and principles. Harold Wilson is the most famous example of a leader who was able to achieve this almost impossible mission. The “Wilson factor”, merging short and long term policy priorities as well as an inevitable process of identity reconstruction, will impact not just on the faculty of Labour to survive the storm, but also on Britain’s ability to avoid the economic and social crash and implement a full, sustainable recovery.
Mirror N. 1, by Umberto Marengo.
ABSTRACT
In the United Kingdom the political weight and experience of the shadow cabinet has proven of crucial importance for the opposition to present itself as a government-in-waiting capable of pressing criticism on the government and also of resetting the political agenda. Visibility and credibility are the two main issues for any opposition party: the shadow cabinet model shows that party leaders need to put faces to policies by shaping a leadership team capable of acting like a proper government
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Glance n.2 by Giovanni Faleg
October 18, 2010
Oct. 8 – Labour shadow cabinet formed
The team that have been passed the torch for Labour in the years to come was announced by Labour leader Ed Miliband on October 8, 2010. The formation of the new shadow cabinet has attracted media attention due to the departure of some prominent Labour figures among them David Miliband, Peter Mendelson, Alistair Darling, Jack Straw and Bob Ainsworth from frontline politics.
Instead some surprising appointments ignited a political debate. Following up party rules Labour leader Ed Miliband has assigned the roles in the shadow cabinet after the Parliamentary Labour Party elected 19 MPs on October 7.
Labour “couple” Yvette Cooper and Ed Balls were both successful and were awarded top jobs. They occupy high-ranking posts of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Home Department. Ms Cooper received the most votes (232), followed by John Healey (Health, 192) and Ed Balls (179).
Among other top positions, Miliband’s leadership campaign manager Sadiq Khan (a British Pakistani that may challenge Conservative Party Chairman Sayeeda Warsi) became Secretary of State for Justice, while senior figures Jim Murphy and Andy Burnham got defence and education.
Quite surprisingly, former Secretary of State for the Home Department Alan Johnson was appointed Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, despite having no experience in financial matters.
A complete list of the newly appointed shadow cabinet members is compiled below (source: Labour Party website):
Leader of the Labour Party – Ed Miliband; Deputy Leader and Shadow Secretary of State for International Development – Harriet Harman; Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer – Alan Johnson; Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Women and Equalities – Yvette Cooper; Shadow Secretary of State for the Home Department – Ed Balls; Shadow Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice (with responsibility for political and constitutional reform) – Sadiq Khan; Shadow Secretary of State for Defence – Jim Murphy; Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills – John Denham; Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions – Douglas Alexander; Shadow Secretary of State for Health – John Healey; Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Election Coordinator – Andy Burnham; Shadow Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government – Caroline Flint; Shadow Secretary of State for Transport – Maria Eagle; Shadow Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change – Meg Hillier; Shadow Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – Mary Creagh; Shadow Minister for the Cabinet Office – Liam Byrne; Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland – Shaun Woodward; Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland – Ann McKechin; Shadow Secretary of State for Wales – Peter Hain; Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport – Ivan Lewis; Shadow Minister for the Olympics – Tessa Jowell; Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury – Angela Eagle; Shadow Leader of the House of Lords – Baroness Royall of Blaisdon; Chief Whip – Rosie Winterton; Shadow Leader of the House of Commons – Hilary Benn; Lords Chief Whip – Lord Bassam of Brighton; Shadow Attorney-General – Baroness Scotland; Parliamentary Labour Party Chair – Tony Lloyd; Shadow Minister of State – Cabinet Office - Jon Trickett.
Oct. 13 – Miliband plays safe against Cameron in first PMQs
During his first PMQs, on October 13, Edward Miliband attacked David Cameron over the changes proposed by the coalition to child benefits and single income families.
The Daily Telegraph described the first round of Cameron vs Miliband as “a fight between the Prime Minister, wielding a moral club with which he expects to intimidate anyone who stands in his way, and Mr Miliband, who is bent on converting Middle England into “Miliband England” by appealing to our naked self-interest”.
In his first role as opposition leader before parliament Mr Miliband did rather well. He played safe and came across as an authoritative, determined and not far too impetuous leader of the opposition, ready for the next round.
Watch the PMQs video on the BBC website
New generation, “good old” Labour?
Opposition parties have criticized Ed Miliband’s cabinet choices, casting aspersions on the lack of economic experience of shadow chancellor Mr. Johnson and denouncing new shadow foreign secretary Yvette Cooper’s support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Other detractors have contended that only 5 members of the cabinet were Ed supporters during the election and that Miliband’s shadow cabinet looks very much like the Blair/Brown New Labour establishment.
The new shadow cabinet may well be a deception for those who believed in a breakup from the New Labour. The reason why a revolutionary change did not come about is that, whatever its intentions, Ed Miliband has to face prevailing political realities. After all, Ed won the election thanks to the support of the base of the party, but MPs in Westminster (who elect the members of the shadow cabinet) largely favored his brother David.
Against this backdrop, however, there are some significant lessons to learn from the formation of the shadow cabinet. Excluding ex-officio members of the cabinet, the leader and the deputy, 8 out of 19 line-ups are new to the frontbench. Only four members of the Shadow Cabinet (Harman, Jowell, Denham and Eagle) have previous parliamentary experience of opposition. Seventeen of the current shadow cabinet members entered parliament from 1997-2005 while Labour was in power, whereas fourteen members got a cabinet post before. Fourteen members are aged under 50.
These data suggest that Mr Miliband is indeed keeping his promises of generational “renewal” of Labour leadership, though not at the detriment of the party’s unity after a divisive leadership contest.
As early as Monday 18th, Labour will unveil its plans for the economy. The weeks ahead will then tell if the new cabinet is able to and capable of turning their intentions into deeds and regain the trust of the electorate.
Glance n.1 by Giovanni Faleg – pic by Giulio Bernardi (from Flickr. All right reserved)
September 27, 2010
Round up
Ed Miliband new UK Labour leader
Labour has chosen its leader: shadow energy secretary Ed Miliband has won the election to be the new leader of the Labour Party. Ed defeated his brother David by a thin margin of 50.65% to 49.35%. According to the BBC, Ed’s dominance across trade unions and grassroots granted him victory in the leadership race, despite David’s acquisition of the majority of support from Labour’s MP in Westminster.
“A party of idealists, not just managers”
What does Ed’s victory mean for Labour? Essentially, it translates into the end of the New Labour era of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. During the campaign Ed, the “change candidate”, explicitly positioned himself at the left of his brother, who had been a close ally of Tony Blair from the first days of New Labour. Accordingly, Ed’s understanding of the future of Labour points out a reappraisal of ideology to overcome the Blairite/Brownite divisions. He calls new generations to change the party into “a movement and a cause”. As far as policy is concerned, Ed will prioritize measures aimed at taxing the rich, tackling inequality and reforming British industry. His programme include the reform of the state to make it more accountable, elderly care and the creation of skilled jobs, a graduate tax to replace tuition fees and halving UK’s deficit through measures such as higher bank levy.
“Red Ed” will surely increase Labour’s popularity with trade unionists and traditional Labour voters. At the same time, however, he will have to address the criticism coming from the Labour’s old guard, and respond to those who claim that his manifesto is not appealing to non natural Labour voters.
In sum, what is to be expected from Ed’s leadership is an ideological rally of Labour and a return to a more social-democratic vision, which entails a withdraw from the New Labour project. If strong enough to placate internal squabbling, Ed’s leadership has the potential to bring Labour “back to the future” of European social-democracy, and hence to provide an update of the concept of progressive politics, which seems to have disappeared from the manifestos of centre-left parties in Europe.
Veltroni and the 75s, or “a chorus of disapproval”: Bersani’s leadership under attack (again)
The most recent – surely not the last – attack on Pier Luigi Bersani’s leadership of the Partito Democratico (PD) came quite unexpectedly, on mid-September, from former PD leader and co-founder Walter Veltroni. The disagreement revolves around the nuovo Ulivo project, referring to the large democratic alliance of center-left parties that should provide Italy with an alternative to Berlusconi’s moldering Popolo della Libertà, in order to bolster economic – and social recovery. Led by PD’s first leader, 75 Veltroniani MPs joined forces and signed a document to denounce Bersani’s political line and calling for a reassessment of the party’s internal balance of power. Veltroni and the 75s advocate a reappraisal of the original majoritary mission (vocazione maggioritaria), meaning that the party should develop concrete policy proposals and broaden the span of its electoral targets, without playing too much tactics and seeking alliances with other fractions. A vision of leadership in and for the PD, which is at odds with Bersani’s project of a broad democratic alliance that explicitly recalls The Olive Tree (L’Ulivo) political coalition led by Romano Prodi between 1995 and 2007.
There ain’t no heroes
In a very delicate phase of Italian politics, Veltroni and the 75s’ move contributes to fraction, rather than unite the PD, its immediate implication being the creation of yet another movement within the party. Furthermore, Veltroni’s attempt to make an official – and public – count of the forces at his disposal is dangerously ill-timed, since it comes after Berlusconi’s call for early elections following the dramatic split with Gianfranco Fini, the co-founder of the Popolo della Libertà. Instead of accepting Bersani’s olive branch and giving full support to party leadership in view of new elections, Veltroni has made a prodigious demonstration of the fact that the Partito Democratico is nothing more than a bunch of naysayers squabbling over their relative power within the party. Curiously enough, to achieve its aim of a strong and unitary party, Veltroni has sought to knock down its leader. Sad, and quite inappropriate.
Wrap up
When Leadership is change
Ed Miliband’s attempt to end the new Labour era, and Pier Luigi Bersani’s efforts to start a new Olive Tree adventure to rally Italian center-left factions reveal a curious paradox: center-left progressive politics in both the UK and Italy is showing a drastic backward movement. Its leaders champion, respectively, the return to a more radical vision of the “old” Labour Party and a revival of the consensus politics that was banned after the collapse of Prodi second cabinet in 2008. The difference is that, while Ed points out the importance of rediscovering ideology in British politics, Bersani acknowledges the need to play tactics and build alliances within Italy’s center-left microcosmos in order to accomplish urgent reforms. Moreover, the two leaders are facing fierce internal opposition to carry through their programmes. However, both the Labour Party and the Partito Democratico need a strong leadership today more than ever. It will be their leaders’ responsibility to reframe the concept of progressive politics and reassure voters that the end of the new Labour and of the majoritarian PD will not come to the detriment of the credibility of their political agenda.